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Abstract
The prices of wine is a key topic for market participants interested in valuing their
stock, including dealers, restaurants or consumers who may be interested in optimizing their
purchases. As a closely related issue, re-valuation is the need to regularly update the value
of a stock. This need is especially met by fund managers in the growing industry of wine as
an investment. In this case, fair-value measurement is compulsory by law. We briefly review
methods available to funds and introduce a new quantitative method aimed at meeting
IFRS 13 compliance for fair valuation. Using auction data, we apply our method to compute
current fair value of a basket of wines.
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1 Introduction
Although consumers generally hold bottles of wine in view of drinking it, some hold it also for
the investment it may represent. Recent literature has highlighted the direct benefits of wine
investment and the positive diversification effects wine can offer to a portfolio of standard assets
(see Sanning et al., 2008 or Fogarty, 2010). Indeed, wine shares many characteristics with other
agricultural goods considered as investments, not least an active auction market that offers
transparency and liquidity to market participants. Wine funds in particular have industrialized
the art of speculating in wine, offering the possibility to actively invest in this alternative asset.
Measuring performance of wine investment funds is needed to properly compute performance
fees of managers, assess fair value of a share in the fund, and, more generally, provide accurate
reporting to all stakeholders involved. Traditional valuation of physical assets by independent
appraisers is slowly rendered obsolete by increasing access to data and automation capabilities.
Furthermore, the growing level of stocks held by wine funds makes a regular “manual” valuation
if not impossible, at least very difficult to achieve. As a consequence, the adoption of IFRS 13
(effective since January 2013) by regulated wine funds requires significant changes to traditional
procedures for determining fair value. To the contrary of stocks and bonds, a wine bottle does not
yield any coupon or dividend, and unlike other conspicuous assets such as art that perpetually
yield aesthetic dividends (Baumol, 1986), wine cannot be consumed without destroying its value.
For the same reason, cash-flows cannot be obtained from renting, or leasing bottles of wine, so
that any type of net-present-value valuation cannot be applied. This research addresses the
question of valuation of wine in the context of wine funds valued in going-concern and that are
subject to IAS-IFRS regulation. We first review the existing literature on quantitative methods
for wine valuation and application of IAS-IFRS in the wine industry.
Valuation of wine generally relates to the application of hedonic regression. Hedonic re-
gression was popularized by Rosen (1974) who suggested that consumers pay a marginal price
for each characteristic of a given good with the sum of these implicit prices consisting in the
observed market price. Golan and Shalit (1993) applied hedonic regression to assess impact of
characteristics of Israeli wines on prices. They created a pricing system based on grape variety.
Oczkowski (1994) focused on Australian wines and included new variables, such as vintage and
region. Nerlove (1995) rather regresses quantity sold on price and quality attributes, since sup-
ply of varieties may not be exogeneously determined. Using data on Bordeaux wines, Combris
et al. (2003) included in the hedonic regression not only the information appearing on the label
of the bottle, but also the sensory characteristics of the wine. They showed that the market
price is mainly determined by objective characteristics. Yoo et al. (2011) use hedonic regression
1
to price wines supplied in British Columbia.
Priilaid and van Rensburgh (2012) identify four categories of explanatory variables: objective
(such as vintage or geographical location), sensory (for instance taste, bouquet), climatic and
chemical wine characteristics (concentration in sugar and alcohol). They use a hedonic regression
methodoloy to assess consumer prices in the South African market.
The question of IAS-IFRS compliance in agricultural markets is discussed by Marsh and
Fischer (2013). The authors mention that wine, as a processed product, is typically excluded
from IAS 41 for agriculture. Azevedo (2007) precisely focuses on the impact of IAS 41 in the
viticulture industry. The author highlights that fair value can be determined based on the price
of active market when it exists but in the case of the wine-growing industry, this exercise is
rendered difficult by heterogeneity of wines accross regions. The author suggests valuing an
agricultural stock of wines by expressing it in litres of wine. Bohusova et al. (2013) review
possibilites for SMEs active in the wine growing industry to properly implement provisions in
an IFRS framework for wines as biological assets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the current environ-
ment and methods presently used by some wine funds. Section 3 introduces a new methodology
to estimate returns of a fund using either the hedonic or repeated-sales approach. We then
illustrate the method using 100 different types of bottles between January and September 2012.
The last section concludes.
2 Current environment
Since 2005, compliance with IAS-IFRS is compulsory for all investment vehicles quoted on
European stock exchanges, including wine funds. Furthermore, the recent European directive
2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM) highlights a growing interest by
supranational bodies to improve transparency in the market of alternative strategies, including
funds that used to be less regulated. “IFRS 13 Fair Value Measurement” has become effective in
January 2013. In this framework, fair-value is defined as “the price that would be received to sell
an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the
measurement date”. For non-financial assets, the selected valuation method must be appropriate
for the measurement consistent with their “highest and best use”. While this notion makes sense
for physical assets such as real estate or machinery (that can be rented or exploited), the “highest
and best use” of a stock held by a wine fund is limited to store it in a well-tempered cellar or
wine-refridgerator. As a consequence, the fair-value of a wine stock must necesseraly rely on
[IFRS 13:24]: it should correspond to a transaction taking place in the principal market for
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the asset or liability or, in the absence of a principal market, in the most advantageous market
for the asset or liability. Since there is no centralized, or principal, market for wine, the most
advantageous market is defined as the one that maximizes the amount that would be received
to sell the asset after taking into account transaction costs and transport costs ([IFRS 13:A1]).
Wine funds currently implement various methods to value their stocks. Table 1 presents
some funds of wine as an investment and which valuation they use, if published. None of the
funds appears to use a historical cost approach, where inventories are valued at acquisition price.
On the contrary, several funds already rely on a market approach to value their stocks, even
Table 1: List of wine investment funds.
Name Location Valuation
The wine investment fund Bermuda Liv-ex system
Nobles Crus Luxemburg Average of dealers and auction prices
The vintage wine fund Cayman Islands Auction data and independent valuation
Wine Growth Fund Luxemburg Unknown
Lunzer Wine Fund British Virgin Islands Liv-ex system and independent valuation
Curzon Cap Fine Wine Geared Growth Fund Guernsey Unknown
SPL Fine Wine NR2 IC Ltd Guernsey Unknown
Patrimoine Grands Crus France Liv-ex system
though IFRS 13 compliance is not obvious in that case. Interestingly, some funds seem to use the
“Liv-ex” valuation methodology promoted by the Liv-ex, an internet and telephone transaction
platform for wine professionals. The company brands itself “industry standard” and “the official
valuer for a number of leading wine funds”.
The Liv-ex platform is organized in a similar fashion as a stock exchange: bids and/or offers
are put on the platform by professionals. In case of a trade happening, both counterparties
are notified of the transaction. The seller then delivers within 14 days the wine to the Liv-ex
warehouse that is verified by Liv-ex. Simultaneously, the buyer sends the funds to Liv-ex that
transfers the money to the seller within three weeks, whereas the buyer can either collect the
wine at the warehouse, or be delivered.
The Liv-ex exploits available information on its platform to produce valuations of wines. The
valuation method is the following: upon submission of a list of wines to be valued, the exchange
verifies the current best offer for each wine in its own system and at other dealers. The valuer
then observes the best bid on the platform and looks at the most recent transaction (within the
last 30 days). If it lies within the bid-offer spread, then this transaction is used for valuation,
otherwise, the mid-price is computed as the average between the bid and the offer. The scenario
becomes more complex when no offer is available. In this case, Liv-ex relies on an undisclosed
list of offer prices by merchants “identified as the major stockholders of wine”. In case no
offer was available in the last 30 days neither at a dealer or on the Liv-ex, then the valuation
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is performed by a “valuation committee” that uses “off-market bids and offers, historical list
prices and transaction data”. In case no bid is available, the bid is estimated from the average
spreads to “orphan offers”, defined as “an offer price where [Liv-ex has] no corresponding bid.
Orphans can be both live exchange offers or merchant list prices”. Surprisingly, the Liv-ex does
not include auction prices in calculation “due to a lack of standardization of auction lots” that
can make weekly prices “very volatile with large swings” and also because “auction commissions
can vary”.
Despite being an interesting approach, the method fails to meet requirements for fair-value
computation of wine as a financial asset, especially in the IFRS 13 sense. First, despite being
a very successful venture with 400 members and more than 1000 transactions per month, there
is little evidence that Liv-ex is the most advantageous market to sell any type of wine that
could be held by a fund. According to Liv-ex, in 2010, Bordeaux wines accounted for 95%
of its exchanges, with five Premiers Crus standing for 61% of Liv-ex trades by value: Chaˆteau
Lafite-Rothschild (Pauillac), Chaˆteau Latour (Pauillac), Chaˆteau Margaux (Margaux), Chaˆteau
Haut-Brion (Pessac, Graves), Chaˆteau Mouton-Rothschild (Pauillac).
In 2011, more than GBP100m worth of wine were exchanged on the Liv-ex platform, which
is a considerable amount in absolute value but indeniably smaller than the yearly USD397m+
worth of transactions reached the same year at major auction houses Acker Merrall and Con-
dit, Christies International, Sothebys, Zachys and Hart Davis Hart Wine Co. In some cases,
favouring ask prices of dealers to estimate a bid price instead of favouring auction house transac-
tions publicly available seems an unreasonable choice given the opacity of dealer prices and the
relative importance of large auction houses in the secondary market for wine (auctions would
account for roughly 10% of the market according to Liv-ex), especially as far as old vintages
and collectible wines are concerned.
As stated by Jones and Storchmann (2001), wines are “traded all over the world in estab-
lished wine auctions. The system guarantees, similar to a stock market, a comparatively high
price transparency. Therefore, it can be assumed that auction prices indicate the relative (eco-
nomic) scarcity and therefore the international esteem for those wines”. Second, unlike auctions,
the Liv-ex is based on standard contracts that assume similar quality for wines presenting sim-
ilar features. This approach, well suited to recent vintages, prevents investors from gaining
complementary information about condition of older wines. In the case of auctions, on the other
hand, Ashenfelter (1989) highlights that at wine auction, “revealing information tends to remove
uncertainty and make low bidders more aggressive; this puts upward pressure on the bidding of
others, which is in the interest of the auctioneer”. Similarly, Muth et al. (2008) showed that in
the market for fed cattle, auction barn prices are higher than equivalent forward prices. Pagano
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and Roell (1996) proved that “the implicit bid-ask spread in a transparent auction is tighter
than in a less transparent dealer market”. For the art market, Bocart and Oosterlinck (2011)
showed that large auction houses act as agents mitigating authenticity issues.
Finally, one can reasonably question the independence of an exchange excluding its competi-
tors (auction houses) but including data from its clients or prospects (dealers). The inclusion of
a valuation committee in case of absence of data lets stakeholders clueless about the method-
ology and data eventually used to perform valuation. In any case, the conflict of interest is
obvious between an exchange that simultaneously acts as intermediary and expert and a fund
whose fee, like the exchange, depends on the price level.
3 New approach to valuation of wine as an investment
IFRS 13 provides three degrees of hierarchy in inputs that can be used for fair value measurement.
The idea behind the hierarchy is that lower levels should be preferred: Level 1 inputs are
“quoted prices in active markets for identical assets or liabilities that the entity can access at
the measurement date. [IFRS 13:76]”. Level 2 inputs “are derived mainly from or corroborated
by observable market data by correlation or other means (’market-corroborated inputs’) [IFRS
13:81]”. Level 3 inputs are unobservable inputs used “with the best information available in the
circumstances, which might include the entity’s own data, taking into account all information
about market participant assumptions that is reasonably available” [IFRS 13:87-89].
In the case of wine, Level 1 inputs are not readily available, especially considering the
fact that available exchanges (Hong-Kong Wine Exchange, BWinex in the Bordeaux region,
Vinetrade in Japan, BBX and Liv-ex in the U.K. to name but a few) are highly specialized
and do not represent the market with the greatest volume and level of activity for the asset or
liability. Level 2 inputs, on the other hand, are accessible to wine funds since, first, they observe
their own transactions, and second, they observe prices reached at auction and also on electronic
platforms. Level 3 inputs are also of significant importance for wine funds since it concerns their
intrinsic qualities to generate profit. Indeed, their strategies often involve acquisition and selling
tactics that best exploits their positioning in the market since they can benefit from significant
economies of scale. Furthermore, they can act as liquidity providers and rip a liquidity premium.
They can best adjust their movements in a market prone to dysfunctionalities, as mentioned
by Ashenfelter (1989): “at the first wine auction I ever attended, I saw the repeal of the law of
one price”, referring to the declining price anomaly in wine auctions provoked by non-optimal
absentee bidders (see Ginsburgh, 1998). Naturally, funds’ strategies differ from each other.
Some specifically focus on heavily traded Bordeaux wines and try to track the overall price
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levels, whereas others play in niche markets of collectibles. They trade intensively in the OTC
(Over The Counter) market for restaurants, dealers and collectors, whose volume of transactions
was estimated to be close to USD 4 billion in 2011. Our approach to fair-valuation of a wine
fund combines level 2 and level 3 inputs.
Level 2 inputs consist of observed transactions, both made by the fund itself and observable
prices reached at auction, buyer’s premium included, for identical wines. The auction market
can be considered as the most advantageous market since it is open to all and applies an English
auction system, known to be the one that maximizes seller revenues amongst auction mechanisms
(see Lopomo 1998). As a consequence, Level 3 inputs should consist of a function that marries the
fair-value of a wine i with its expected price p at auction at time t (pit). Formally, wit = E(pit),
that is, the fair-value w of wine i at time t should be the expected price at auction of the same
wine i at time t. If for a wine an identical peer is observed simultaneously at auction, the fair
value should simply be wit = pit. However, if no such price is observed, E(pit) needs to be
estimated:
wit = E(pit) = viti exp(rti,t + δ) (1)
where viti is the acquisition price of wine i at time ti, which is the last time a transaction was
made by the fund on wine i, and rti,t is the log-return of prices between time ti and t. The term
δ is the spread between auction prices and transaction prices, which can be estimated by using,
for instance, the mean or the median of log(vi,t − pi,t) for those wines for which both auction
and transaction prices are available at the same time.
Estimation of returns is generally tackled by two approaches: repeated-sales-regression and
hedonic regression. In repeated-sales-regression (Bailey et al., 1963), only pairs of sales of
identical wines are taken into consideration to compute their returns. A single trend in price is
then obtained by averaging these returns. Formally,
rist := log(vit)− log(vis) (2)
=
t∑
τ=s
βτXiτ + εi, (3)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where rist is the log-return of wine i with an observed transaction at time s and
another at time t with s < t, βt is the marginal impact of time t and Xit is a dummy variable
that takes the value −1 if the transaction was observed at time s, +1 if the transaction was
observed at time t, and 0 otherwise. Finally, εi is an error term. This model can be estimated
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by OLS. Then, the estimated return to be used in equation (1) is given by
rti,t = βˆt − βˆti (4)
An important concern with repeated-sales-regression is the fact that observations that don’t
fall in pairs are wasted (Chanel et al., 1996). In the case of wines, this could concern, for instance,
exceptionnaly rare bottles or rare productions. As an alternative, in hedonic regression, all wines
are regressed on their intrinsic characteristics in order to obtain the residual marginal impact
of time on prices. Since not all wines are traded at all times at auction and/or in the fund, we
suggest the following semi-log hedonic approach based on internal transaction v on wine i at
time t:
log(vit) = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αkXik + βt + νi, (5)
where α0 is an intercept, Xik is the kth characteristic of wine i (such as vintage, region, chaˆteau,
etc.), of which there are K. The term βt is the marginal impact of time on prices which is the
same across wines. We suppose that βt is an unknown smooth function of time which for
identification is restricted to have a mean of zero. Finally, νi is a Gaussian error term with
mean zero.
The model can be estimated similar to Bocart and Hafner (2011). At a first stage, estimate
log(vit) = α0 +
K∑
k=1
αkXi,k + ηit (6)
by OLS, where ηit = βt + νi is a mean zero error term. At a second stage, estimate βt by a
Nadaraya-Watson estimator,
βˆt =
∑N
i=1K(
t−ti
h )ηi,t∑N
i=1K(
t−ti
h )
, (7)
where K is a kernel function such as the Gaussian kernel, and h is a bandwidth that can be
selected using, for instance, a plug-in bandwidth selection (Gasser et al., 1991).
This approach has several important advantages: First, it reconciles transaction levels of
funds with verifiable market inputs of auction prices. As a consequence, the approach penalizes
funds that overpay wine, hence overestimate their stock using a historical cost approach. On
the other hand, it properly reflects fair value of funds that can benefit from economies of scales,
ensuring, for example, that redemptions be made at a fair level. Second, it allows fair valuation
of the stock at all times, given the fact that βt is continuous, so that even rarely traded wines
or collectible editions can be tracked through time. Finally, since the error term in centered on
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zero, the overall revaluation of the fund is expected to be asymptotically correct.
4 Empirical results
We create a virtual stock made of 206 transactions in 110 different types of wines from Bour-
gogne, Rhoˆne and Bordeaux. Transaction prices are either prices observed at auction, at
Sotheby’s Hong-Kong, Christie’s London and Acker Merrall Hong-Kong or on online websites
such as La Place des Vins and Laithwaite’s, between January and September 2012. All prices are
translated in euros using the daily exchange rate. The portfolio is revalued in September 2012.
Out of the 110 types of wines, 35 have matching transactions at public auction (in the auction
houses mentioned above) in September 2012 that can relate to 53 transactions out of the 206.
We compare revaluation using returns estimated with a hedonic approach, regression approach
and revaluation using historical cost. Valuations for these 53 transactions are presented in Table
2.
The hedonic regression is made using 51 explanatory variables and 8 time dummies. The
51 explanatory variables are split into 5 categories: region, name of the wine, format (magnum
or bottle), producer and vintage. Results from the regression are available in Table 3. The
estimated δ (relative spread) between transactions and observed auction prices if of -0.402. The
estimate was obtained using the median of the differences between the logged auction prices and
the logged transaction prices.
For the repeated-sales-regression, we use 27 pairs available in our sample. Results for the
regression are presented in Table 4. δ in the case of the returns estimated with RSR is of -
0.581, lower than the hedonic approach, meaning that, at least in our exemple, RSR initially
overestimated the returns as compared to hedonic. There is, however, no reason to believe
that this will always be the case. The largely negative δ in our exemple is mainly due to the
fact that prices used to construct our exemple are mostly ask prices from online dealers. To
the contrary, an actual fund is expected to encounter a positive δ, which would mean that its
structure allows it to buy at interesting levels. If it is not the case, then it would mean that
its strategy is sub-optimal as compared to simply acquiring wine at auction houses. Table 5
presents results for the overall valuations: the historical cost method yields a total valuation of
508,849 euros, which stand for the money spent in all for the stock. By comparison, the hedonic-
based revaluation yields a value of 417,670 euros, against 454,406 euros for the revaluation using
RSR. When focusing only on the 53 bottles that have a true observation at auction, 176,859
euros were spent on them (historical cost), but they would be revalued at only 145,827 euros in
September 2012 at auction. By comparison, the hedonic method yields a valuation of 145,297
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Table 2: Results from revaluation for 53 transactions (out of 206)
Name Date of acquisition Auction Hedonic RSR Historical cost
montrachet 2007 (bt) 10/01/2012 3,200 2,910 6,899 2,990
la tache 2003 (bt) 16/02/2012 1,650 2,496 3,964 2,616
montrachet 2005 (bt) 01/03/2012 3,775 3,496 4,848 3,738
montrachet 2008 (bt) 08/03/2012 2,700 3,636 5,042 3,887
montrachet 2000 (bt) 13/03/2012 3,350 3,496 4,848 3,738
montrachet 2004 (bt) 15/03/2012 3,025 3,496 4,848 3,738
montrachet 2001 (bt) 16/03/2012 3,600 3,496 4,848 3,738
montrachet 2007 (bt) 19/03/2012 3,200 3,706 5,139 3,962
la tache 2003 (magnum) 02/04/2012 4,000 4,524 6,163 4,934
echezeaux 2005 (bt) 11/04/2012 678 685 934 748
montrachet 2005 (bt) 14/04/2012 3,775 4,524 6,163 4,934
vosne-romanee 1 cru 2008 (bt) 15/04/2012 450 318 434 347
richebourg 2007 (bt) 16/04/2012 551 685 934 748
romanee st. vivant 2007 (bt) 19/04/2012 465 685 934 748
romanee st. vivant 2005 (bt) 21/04/2012 1,063 1,371 1,868 1,495
la tache 2005 (bt) 22/04/2012 3,300 3,427 4,669 3,738
haut-brion 2000 (bt) 05/05/2012 765 807 835 897
latour 2000 (bt) 11/05/2012 1,250 1,344 1,392 1,495
montrachet 2003 (bt) 22/05/2012 3,525 3,361 3,481 3,738
romanee-conti 2007 (bt) 01/06/2012 7,550 8,798 8,505 10,465
mouton-rothschild 2000 (bt) 02/06/2012 1,275 974 942 1,159
romanee-conti 2001 (bt) 08/06/2012 7,900 8,798 8,505 10,465
lafite-rothschild 2000 (bt) 10/06/2012 2,425 2,388 2,308 2,841
haut-brion 2000 (bt) 11/06/2012 765 786 759 934
montrachet 2008 (bt) 13/06/2012 2,700 3,394 3,280 4,037
montrachet 2007 (bt) 15/06/2012 3,200 3,394 3,280 4,037
romanee-conti 2008 (bt) 15/06/2012 8,850 8,798 8,505 10,465
margaux 2000 (bt) 16/06/2012 970 1,100 1,063 1,308
latour 2000 (bt) 19/06/2012 1,250 1,257 1,215 1,495
romanee-conti 2007 (bt) 19/06/2012 7,550 8,798 8,505 10,465
ausone 2000 (bt) 21/06/2012 1,625 1,885 1,822 2,243
la tache 2009 (magnum) 23/07/2012 7,400 7,221 7,521 9,269
ausone 2000 (bt) 25/07/2012 1,625 1,281 1,334 1,645
mouton-rothschild 2000 (bt) 03/08/2012 1,275 1,025 928 1,420
lafite-rothschild 2000 (bt) 08/08/2012 2,425 2,266 2,052 3,140
haut-brion 2000 (bt) 10/08/2012 765 745 674 1,032
romanee-conti 2007 (bt) 11/08/2012 7,550 7,555 6,841 10,465
chambertin clos de bze 2009 (bt) 14/08/2012 970 1,079 977 1,495
romanee-conti 2002 (bt) 15/08/2012 9,200 7,555 6,841 10,465
latour 2000 (bt) 18/08/2012 1,250 944 855 1,308
lafite-rothschild 2000 (bt) 22/08/2012 2,425 1,856 1,681 2,571
chambertin clos de bze 2008 (bt) 25/08/2012 970 513 464 710
montrachet 2008 (bt) 25/08/2012 2,700 2,698 2,443 3,738
chambertin 2008 (bt) 28/08/2012 1,170 513 464 710
latour 2000 (bt) 03/09/2012 1,250 850 710 1,271
chambertin clos de bze 2006 (bt) 12/09/2012 970 400 334 598
romanee-conti 2008 (bt) 12/09/2012 8,850 6,501 5,432 9,718
chambertin clos de bze 2005 (bt) 14/09/2012 970 1,000 836 1,495
chambertin 2005 (bt) 23/09/2012 1,170 1,000 836 1,495
chambertin 2006 (bt) 24/09/2012 1,170 425 355 635
ruchottes-chambertin 2006 (bt) 26/09/2012 370 200 167 299
chambertin clos de bze 2009 (bt) 28/09/2012 970 833 696 1,246
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Table 3: Variables in the hedonic regression and their coefficients
Variable Estimate s.d T-test p-value
(Intercept) 7.48 0.2 32.1 1.04E-67 ***
(region)bourgogne -1.16 0.3 -3.4 8.83E-04 ***
(region)rhone -1.59 0.3 -5.8 3.81E-08 ***
(name)bonnes mares 0.21 0.3 0.7 4.86E-01
(name)carruades de lafite -1.56 0.2 -8.4 3.78E-14 ***
(name)chambertin 0.37 0.3 1.2 2.16E-01
(name)chambertin clos de bze 0.29 0.3 1 3.37E-01
(name)chambolle les amoureuses 0.49 0.3 1.7 9.82E-02 .
(name)charmes-chambertin -1.08 0.4 -2.6 1.01E-02 *
(name)cheval blanc -0.58 0.2 -2.4 1.70E-02 *
(name)clos de la roche -1.08 0.4 -2.6 1.01E-02 *
(name)corton-charlemagne 0.14 0.3 0.5 6.09E-01
(name)echezeaux 0.66 0.2 2.8 6.66E-03 **
(name)gevrey 1er cru clos st jacques -0.59 0.3 -1.8 7.21E-02 .
(name)griotte-chambertin 0.16 0.3 0.5 6.24E-01
(name)haut-brion -0.5 0.2 -3 3.52E-03 **
(name)hermitage blanc -0.53 0.3 -1.6 1.23E-01
(name)loville las cases -1.88 0.2 -7.8 1.33E-12 ***
(name)la mission haut-brion -0.9 0.2 -4.2 4.03E-05 ***
(name)la mission haut-brion blanc 0.11 0.3 0.4 7.20E-01
(name)la tache 1.94 0.2 8.5 2.14E-14 ***
(name)lafite-rothschild -0.05 0.1 -0.4 6.97E-01
(name)latour -0.14 0.1 -0.9 3.63E-01
(name)le pin 0.87 0.2 4.2 5.49E-05 ***
(name)les forts de latour -1.6 0.2 -7.8 8.53E-13 ***
(name)margaux -0.47 0.2 -2.3 2.09E-02 *
(name)mazis-chambertin -1.08 0.4 -2.6 1.01E-02 *
(name)montrachet 2.13 0.2 10 3.16E-18 ***
(name)mouton-rothschild -0.31 0.2 -1.3 1.90E-01
(name)musigny 1.66 0.3 5.9 2.81E-08 ***
(name)petrus 0.79 0.2 3.3 1.06E-03 **
(name)richebourg 1.17 0.3 4.5 1.25E-05 ***
(name)roman-conti 3.22 0.2 13.1 2.36E-26 ***
(name)roman st. vivant 1.03 0.2 4.3 3.68E-05 ***
(name)ruchottes-chambertin -0.61 0.4 -1.5 1.44E-01
(producer)coche-dury 0.7 0.3 2.2 3.05E-02
(producer)comte lafon -1.67 0.3 -5 1.32E-06
(producer)drc -0.42 0.2 -2.6 1.08E-02
(producer)faiveley -0.28 0.3 -0.9 3.68E-01
(producer)ponsot 0.88 0.4 2.4 1.73E-02
(format)magnum 0.65 0.1 5 1.73E-06
(vintage)2001 0.38 0.2 1.8 7.36E-02
(vintage)2002 0.37 0.2 2.2 3.06E-02
(vintage)2003 0.02 0.2 0.1 8.95E-01
(vintage)2004 0.08 0.2 0.3 7.30E-01
(vintage)2005 0.69 0.1 4.9 2.14E-06
(vintage)2006 -0.18 0.2 -1.1 2.92E-01
(vintage)2007 -0.03 0.2 -0.2 8.45E-01
(vintage)2008 0.04 0.2 0.2 8.25E-01
(vintage)2009 0.48 0.1 3.3 1.26E-03
(vintage)2010 -0.06 0.1 -0.6 5.56E-01
(vintage)2011 -0.74 0.1 -7.2 3.36E-11
(month)beta2 -0.1 0.2 -0.4 6.74E-01
(month)beta3 -0.21 0.2 -1.1 2.90E-01
(month)beta4 -0.17 0.2 -0.9 3.63E-01
(month)beta5 -0.06 0.2 -0.3 7.74E-01
(month)beta6 0 0.2 0 9.94E-01
(month)beta7 -0.06 0.2 -0.3 7.81E-01
(month)beta8 -0.03 0.2 -0.2 8.79E-01
(month)beta9 0.16 0.2 0.8 4.20E-01
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 0.2794 on 145 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.9448, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9219
F-statistic: 41.34 on 60 and 145 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16
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Table 4: RSR
Variable Estimate s.d T-test p-value
beta1 - 0.21 0.07 - 2.89 9.68E-03
beta2 0.21 0.16 1.31 2.06E-01
beta3 0.37 0.26 1.38 1.84E-01
beta4 0.40 0.21 1.89 7.55E-02
beta5 0.70 0.24 2.90 9.58E-03
beta6 0.83 0.26 3.20 4.91E-03
beta7 0.83 0.29 2.89 9.76E-03
beta8 1.05 0.32 3.33 3.69E-03
beta9 1.21 0.36 3.36 3.46E-03
Signif. codes: 0 *** 0.001 ** 0.01 * 0.05 . 0.1 1
Residual standard error: 0.1427 on 18 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6639, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5145
F-statistic: 4.445 on 8 and 18 DF, p-value: 0.004109
Table 5: Valuation of stock
Stock Method Value, September 2012 (EUR)
53 bottles Auction prices 145,827
53 bottles Hedonic-based 145,297
53 bottles RSR-based 159,376
53 bottles Historical cost 176,859
206 bottles Auction prices unknown
206 bottles Hedonic-based 417,670
206 bottles RSR-based 454,406
206 bottles Historical cost 508,849
11
euros for these 53 bottles, whereas the RSR-based method gives an estimate of 159,376 euros.
5 Conclusion
IFRS 13 compliant revaluation of wine as an investment is an important topic for fund managers,
investors and fiscal authorities. Since the notion of “highest and best use” for non-financial assets
is difficult to apply for bottles of wine, a fair valuation can only rely on a market approach.
Unfortunately, wines are heterogeneous goods that are not traded continuously. Furthermore,
they can be traded at different places: dealers, local exchanges and auction houses. Wine funds
use independent valuation, auction and dealers based methodology, or the so-called “Liv-ex”
method. We argue that none of these fully satisfy the stringent requirements of IFRS 13. They
either fail to justify the origin of data (such as in the case of independent expertise), hence the
type of input, or are calibrated on markets that are not principal or most advantageous (such
as the Liv-ex). We suggest estimating returns of a wine portfolio by applying either hedonic
or repeated sales approach. We advocate that data used to calibrate the model should be the
fund’s own transactions corrected for a possible spread with data from auction houses, the latter
being the biggest observable market for wine transaction, and the one that best fits the definition
of “most advantageous market”. Our empirical results show similar performance between the
hedonic and repeated-sales approach. A historical cost approach yields distorted results and
fails to capture the market’s dynamics.
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